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Abstract 
EU policy makers are currently debating copyright reforms which aim to 
provide an ecosystem for the effective combatting of online infringements 
through the use of algorithms while fostering, amongst other things, 
cultural diversity. As the goals set by the EU Commission for the Digital 
Single Market Strategy will only be met if cultural diversity is adequately 
preserved and promoted, it is important to analyse how algorithms operate 
as copyright enforcement mechanisms. This article provides an empirical 
analytical framework on how cultural diversity can be measured in the 
context of copyright reform suited for the digital environment. 
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 Introduction 
The EU Commission aims to contribute to the functioning of the internal single 
market by increasing the dissemination of cultural expressions originating in 
other Member States for the benefit of users across the EU territory. Through its 
Digital Single Market Strategy (‘DSMS’), the Commission intends to facilitate 
access and choice of online content as well as to create a fairer and more 
sustainable market place for creators and creative industries by means of a new 
Copyright Directive and intellectual property enforcement strategies.1 As a 
result, it is presumed that cultural diversity within the Union will be preserved 
and promoted.2  In the proposed Directive, an assumption is made that online 
video-sharing platforms introducing “effective measures” (which may include 
automated anti-piracy systems, or “AAPSs”) contribute to the preservation of 
diversity of cultural works.3 To verify this assumption, we have examined the 
impact of AAPSs on the cultural diversity currently present on video-sharing 
platforms. The project focused upon YouTube4 in particular, and analysed the 
impact of Content ID on the diversity of expressions over a limited period (2012-
2016). Given the significant lack of transparency regarding how Content ID 
                                                 
1  European Commission, 6/5/2015, A Digital Single Market for Europe: Commission sets out 16 
initiatives to make it happen, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
4919_en.htm (accessed 20 March 2018). 
2  Sabine Jacques et al., “Automated anti-piracy systems as copyright enforcement mechanism: 
the need to consider cultural diversity” (2018) 40(4) European Intellectual Property Review 218-
228, p. 218. 
3  Speech by Vice-President Ansip at CEIPI/European Audiovisual Observatory event 
“Copyright Enforcement in the Online World” (22 November 2016), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/ansip/announcements/speech-vice-president-
ansip-ceipieuropean-audiovisual-observatory-event-copyright-enforcement-online_en 
(accessed 20 March 2018). 
4  A primarily consumer-to-consumer (C2C) ad-funded hosting intermediary but it is also a 
Business-to-consumers (B2C) intermediary by its partnership with the creative industries. 
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operates5 and the difficulty in accessing meaningful data,6 this study designs an 
analytical framework for measuring cultural diversity which revolves around 
variety, balance, and disparity, as well as distinguishing between supplied and 
consumed diversity in the online music sector. 
Cultural diversity is often suggested as a policy goal. However, this 
concept remains largely undefined7 and existing studies have generally focused 
on a single dimension, namely variety.8 In the music field, diversity is generally 
measured through language, genre, and country of origin. The main problem 
with existing studies looking at diversity from a single dimension is that we may 
have a skewed picture of the diversity present in a given sample. While this may 
give a representation of quantitative diversity, these say very little in terms of 
diversity in the content from a qualitative perspective that focuses, for example, 
less on numerical appraisal and more on the viewpoints expressed.  
In the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, “cultural diversity” is 
broadly defined as referring “to the manifold ways in which the cultures of 
groups and societies find expression”,9 which explains the importance of the 
human rights framework in ensuring its preservation.10 This broad definition 
                                                 
5  Content ID and the structure of other AAPSs’ is currently kept secret as these are used as 
competitive advantage by intermediaries.  
6  While “manual” takedown notices are published in the Google transparency report and 
Lumen project, there is limited information available in relation to the operation of 
algorithms.  
7  The UNESCO adopted a Convention on Cultural diversity on 20 October 2005. 
8  There is no legal definition and no consensus within the literature. For example, Peterson 
and Berger measures it by referring to the number of different songs in the US top 10 hit 
parade over a limited period of time, Richard Peterson and David Berger, “Cycles in Symbol 
Production: The Case of Popular Music” (1975) 40 American Sociological Review 158-173, p. 
159; or Peter Alexander, “Entropy and Popular Culture: Product Diversity in the Popular 
Music Recording Industry” (1996) 61 American Sociological Review 171-174, p. 171.  
9  Article 4(1) UNESCO Convention on Cultural diversity on 20 October 2005. 
10  Ibid., Article 2(1). 
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takes a multi-dimensional approach to variety, balance, and disparity.11 Here, we 
propose an analytical framework adequate for the digital environment which 
measures diversity from a multi-dimensional perspective by looking at 
quantitative and qualitative diversity in the production and consumption of 
cultural goods.12 
Focusing on musical parodies, we assess the impact of algorithms on the 
diversity of cultural expressions under the current legal regime. Section 1 revisits 
general principles of freedom of expression and the copyright regime. Section 2 
reviews the enforcement of these rights in the digital environment. Section 3 
attempts to illustrate how these algorithms jeopardise the copyright paradigm 
and freedom of expression. Section 4 justifies our focus on parodies in this 
context. Sections 5 and 6 analyse the findings of our empirical study providing 
an example of the magnitude of the effect of these algorithms. Finally, Section 7 
sets out the recommendations for Content ID specifically, and proposes a robust 
regulatory regime for delineating how online content should be filtered, blocked, 
or removed in compliance with freedom of expression and cultural diversity. The 
final Section speculates on what the future may hold. 
 Balancing freedom of expression with proprietary rights 
In the absence of a robust regulatory framework, the preservation and promotion 
of cultural diversity is achieved through the human rights framework and most 
importantly through the promotion of freedom of expression. Increasingly, 
                                                 
11  Andrew Stirling, “On the economics and analysis of diversity” (1998) SPRU Electronic 
Working Papers Series 28, available at 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sewp28&site=25 (accessed 20 
March 2018). 
12  Similar definition adopted by Benhamou and Peltier. See Françoise Benhamou and 
Stéphanie Peltier, “How should cultural diversity be measures? An application using the 
French publishing industry” (2007) 31(2) Journal of Cultural Economics 85-107, p. 86. 
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however, copyright is accused of curbing creativity, stifling freedom of 
expression, and jeopardising cultural diversity in favour of protecting exclusive 
proprietary rights.13 Creators and the wider public criticise the copyright system 
for not providing enough breathing space for new cultural expressions to thrive. 
Simultaneously, copyright owners argue that cultural diversity is under threat 
due to the volume of copyright infringements taking place online. Beyond these 
positions, it is asserted that, however copyright operates, there is an inherent 
tension between cultural diversity and freedom of expression, and that 
maximising one may not maximise the other.14  
This is recognised in law. If freedom of expression consists of a broad15 
right including the right to impart, seek and receive information, its exercise may 
be subject to restrictions which are partly defined in international instruments. 
Such restrictions include the protection of the rights of others, which 
encompasses the right to property and, consequently, copyright.  
In European countries, any restriction, including copyright, on the right to 
freedom of expression must be construed strictly16 and is limited by a three-
                                                 
13  Carys Craig, “Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict between 
Freedom of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56 University of Toronto Law Journal 75-114, p. 
76; David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of 
Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55 University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 175-240, p. 184. 
14  On the ambiguous relation between copyright and freedom of expression, see Alexandra 
Couto, “Copyright and Freedom of Expression: A Philosophical Map” in Axel Gosseries, 
Alain Marciano, and Alain Strowel (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), p. 160; Christina Angelopoulos, “Freedom of expression and copyright: 
the double balancing act” (2008) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly 328-353, p. 328. 
15  It includes expressions which might offend, shock or disturb the States or groups of 
individuals, because such expressions are part of pluralism - essential feature of a 
democratic society, requiring tolerance and broadmindedness. Being media-neutral, 
freedom of expression is applicable to all types of communication. Handyside v UK (1976) 1 
EHRR 737, para. 49 and Sunday Times (No 1) v UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245 repeated in amongst 
others Ashby Donald and others v France (2013) Application No. 36769/08, para. 31; Oberschlick 
v Austrian (1991) 19 EHHR 389, para. 57. 
16  Amongst others Peta Deutschland v Germany (2012), No. 43481/09, para. 46. 
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pronged test based on the facts of a particular case.17 The restriction must be 
provided by law (principle of predictability), pursue a particular aim (principle 
of legitimacy), and be necessary (principles of necessity and proportionality). The 
latter is interpreted as requiring the restriction to be “necessary in a democratic 
society”.18  
Likewise, copyright legislation does not confer absolute rights to right-
holders, because the right to property itself is not absolute. Copyright grants 
transferable economic and waivable non-economic exclusive rights to an author 
for a fixed period of time to authorise, amongst others, reproduction and 
communication to the public of copyright-protected works. Protection is further 
limited by the requirements for copyright to subsist. For example, copyright does 
not protect ideas but rather the expression of these ideas, provided that this 
expression satisfies the originality19 threshold in relation to authorial works.20 
Finally, national legislators can limit the scope of copyright protection by 
introducing exceptions and limitations, in accordance with the public interest or 
other policy to implement social, economic and cultural policies.  
Given the absence of any hierarchy, no one freedom prevails over the 
other. Equal weight should be allocated to each right in a manner which ensures 
the realisation of all freedoms.21 This implies a balancing of the rights in play to 
maximise their realisation. Nevertheless, there is a series of factors that can be 
                                                 
This test was initially introduced in art. 19(3) ICCPR and later repeated in other legal 
instruments, including art. 10(2) ECHR. This test is applicable to online expressions as well. 
General Comment No. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34, adopted on 12/9/2011, para. 43. 
18  See art. 10(2) ECHR. 
19  In the EU, this threshold is the “author’s own intellectual creation”. See Infopaq International 
A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) ECLI:EU:C:2009:465 [2009], para. 37.  
20  Literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works. 
21  Paul Torremans, “Copyright (and Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right” in 
Paul Torremans (eds.), Intellectual Property and Human Rights (3rd ed., Kluwer Law 
International, 2015), p. 252. 
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used to determine whether a restriction on the exercise of freedom of expression 
based on copyright is justified.  
As the right to freedom of expression is a broad-ranging right, states’ and 
courts’ discretion is narrower in the application of restrictions based on 
copyright. Where a copyright exception aims at preserving freedom of 
expression, it must not be interpreted restrictively to meet the purposes and 
objectives of said exception. Exceptions such as fair dealing must, therefore, have 
their purposes interpreted broadly, and the requirements attached interpreted 
strictly.22 Most importantly, both online and offline, the impact of restrictions on 
the right to freedom of expression based on copyright or other grounds must be 
carefully scrutinised. Therefore, to respect due process, restrictions on freedom 
of expression must undergo the proportionality test in each and every case in 
order to be compatible with human rights. This exercise is consequently of 
paramount importance to the protection and promotion of cultural diversity 
online.  
 The rise of automated anti-piracy systems to fight 
online piracy 
Both the EU and the USA have established copyright enforcement regimes 
which, if not inviting, are at least are compatible with automation.23 This may be 
                                                 
22   Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others (C-201/13) 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132 [2014], para. 22; Attorney General in Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds 
VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others (C-201/13)  ECLI:EU:C:2014:458 [2014], para. 43; NLA 
(C-360/13), para. 23; Order in Infopaq II (C-302/10), para. 27; Eva-Maria Painer v Standard 
VerlagsGmbH and Others (C-145/10) ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 [2011], para. 109; Infopaq International 
A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) ECLI:EU:C:2009:465 [2009], paras. 56-57. 
23  For the EU, see proposed new Copyright Directive (art. 13 and Recitals 38 and 39); in the US, 
the Office of US Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) also condoned these 
private arrangements. See for example Office of the US Intellectual Property Enforcement, 
Joint Strategic Plan (2013), p. 35; Role of Voluntary Agreements in the US Intellectual Property 
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justified by the international intellectual property framework, since art. 8 of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (together with its Agreed Statement) states: “mere 
provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not 
in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention”.24 Hence, signatory parties must “permit effective action against 
any act of infringement of rights covered by this Treaty, including expeditious 
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to 
further infringements”.25 
While the E-Commerce Directive and Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
do not mention AAPSs explicitly, the trend towards the latter could be a path to 
practical compliance with the WIPO treaties. The burden currently falls on the 
right-holders to prove that an intermediary does not meet the safe harbour 
requirements which, in most cases, results in high costs for right-holders.26 
Preparing a valid takedown notification every time an infringing copyright work 
is discovered is also burdensome for the right-holders, making automated 
notification to intermediaries an attractive prospect. Faced with a potentially 
huge number of notices which must be dealt with expeditiously, intermediaries 
might wish to automate their processing as well as the procedure of notifying users 
that some of their content is being blocked. Hence, there are incentives for both 
right-holders and intermediaries to develop a fully automated systematisation of 
                                                 
System: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the 
Committee On the Judiciary, House of Representatives (113th Cong. (2013)). 
24  WCT Agreed Statement regarding article 8. 
25  Arts. 14 WCT and 23 WPPT. 
26  Some right-holders argue that these intermediaries should act as gatekeepers as the advent 
of technologies puts them in a better position to tackle online copyright infringement. 
Benjamin Boroughf, “The next great YouTube: Improving Content ID to foster creativity, 
cooperation and fair compensation” (2015) 25(1) Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology 
95, p. 103; Rebecca Alderfer-Rock, “Fair Use Analysis in DMCA Takedown Notices: 
Necessary or Noxious?” (2014) 86(3) Temple Law Review 691-720, p. 694.  
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online copyright enforcement. Moreover, there is an incentive for right-holders 
(typically represented by collecting rights societies) and intermediaries to 
collaborate on the design of such tools. Yet, one might wonder whether such 
collaboration in a digital environment (which facilitates the connection of 
cultures) creates a danger that unique cultural differences will be diluted by 
homogenisation, or misappropriated owing to ineptitude on the part of the legal 
framework. 
Hence, in the absence of any over-arching legal obligation, algorithms 
have been introduced because of voluntary private initiatives, built upon 
agreements between right-holders and intermediaries, which increase the right-
holder’s control over works shared online by third parties.27  
3.1 The functioning of Content ID 
YouTube operates the most well-known example of such an initiative, known as 
Content ID. First introduced mid-2007, this rights management system was the 
result of agreements between YouTube and a number of the major record labels 
and musical publishers, extended later to independent labels too. A proportion 
of revenue generated through advertising is shared between YouTube and the 
right-holder according to the agreed terms. 
                                                 
27  Qualified as “DMCA Plus’ intermediaries in the seminal empirical study from 2016, by 
Urban, Karaganis and Schofield. Later, Bridy distinguished two types of DMCA Plus 
intermediaries. DMCA Plus type 1 relates to intermediaries covered by the DMCA safe 
harbours and which voluntarily venture into private monitoring initiatives and type 2, 
comprising the intermediaries who venture into simile voluntary private initiative but which 
do not meet the safe harbour provisions” requirements. Jennifer Urban, Joe Karaganis and 
Brianna Schofield, “Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice” (29 March 2016) UC 
Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628; Annemarie Bridy, “Copyright’s digital 
deputies: DMCA-Plus enforcement by Internet intermediaries” in John Rothchild (ed.), 
Research Handbook on Electronic Commerce Law (Edward Elgar, 2016), pp. 185–208, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628827 (accessed 21 March 2018). 
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Using digital fingerprinting technology,28 the Content ID algorithm cross-
checks all newly-uploaded content against an established database of copyright-
protected works based upon the partners’ repertoires. This database comprises a 
reference file for the copyright-protected work as well as “asset” metadata, i.e. a 
wide range of the content’s inherent properties. The algorithm is able to detect 
any part of audio or video content, even if modified, which is stored in the 
database repository. A match results in an automated notification being sent to 
the relevant partners, who can customise their response. According to Youtube’s 
least to most restrictive options, a partner can (1) do nothing, (2) add advertising 
and collect the revenue, (3) monitor its viewing statistics, (4) block its content (the 
content will not be audible or viewable on YouTube), or (5) issue a manual take-
down request. Partners may choose a course of action in advance so it will be 
pursued automatically in the event that matching content is uploaded to the 
platform. The action can even be customised by the partner with respect to the 
extent of the match, its format (sound, video, or both), and the territory in which 
it is applied.  
3.2 Limitations 
The system is not without limitations. The algorithm is unable to detect whether 
a work is in the public domain, falling outside the scope of copyright, or covered 
by an exception or limitation.29 To mitigate this shortcoming, YouTube 
introduced an internal dispute resolution system as required under s. 512(g) of 
                                                 
28  Digital fingerprinting is to be distinguished from watermarking. See Dominic Milano, 
“Content control: digital watermarking and fingerprinting” (Rhozet White Paper), available 
at https://www.digimarc.com/docs/default-source/technology-resources/white-
papers/rhozet_wp_fingerprinting_watermarking.pdf (accessed 21 March 2018). 
29  Jacques, supra n. 2, pp. 225-227. 
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the DMCA.30 However, as explained in an earlier paper, the absence of 
independent oversight puts too much power in the hands of partners.31  
 Choosing musical parodies as a case study 
Empirical research into the impact of algorithms in decision-making has mainly 
focused on the efficiency of these in content detection, and their implications for 
the music industry.32 With this research project, we design a theoretical 
framework to evaluate cultural diversity online from a multi-dimensional 
perspective, taking into consideration both quantitative and qualitative content 
aspects. To do so, we decided to focus on the case of parodies, because this 
particular form of expression enables individuals to critique, through comedy, 
mockery, or satire, an idea, value or person. Such critiques both represent a 
lynchpin of democracy, and offer qualitative aspects worthy of study. 
Furthermore, parodies rely on other works to exist, which is easier for the 
algorithm to detect. Thus, parodies constitute an effective means of measuring 
how content is reused and what kind of new cultural expressions flourish 
through this genre. 
Before turning to the role of algorithms in preserving the diversity of 
parodic expressions, it is important to note some of the general challenges for 
parodies to thrive in the digital era. To participate in a democratic society, citizens 
must be able to accept or reject, via ridicule or parody, the messages, cultural 
values, attitudes, or other forms of behaviour that constitute their society. 
                                                 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Mainly to process the manual notice and takedown. Paul Heald, “How notice-and-takedown 
regimes create markets for music on YouTube: an empirical study” in Andreas Rahmatian 
(ed.) Concepts of Music and Copyright (Edward Elgar, 2015), p. 195; Ben Depoorter and Robert 
Walker, “Copyright False Positives” (2013) 89(1) Notre Dame Law Review 319-360, p. 326.  
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Simultaneously, EU copyright legislation requires a high level of copyright 
protection,33 providing strong incentives for the promotion of cultural 
endeavours.34 The fragmentation of legislation and divergence in judicial 
interpretation means however that legal uncertainty has arisen. 
Relying on the Berne Convention,35 several legislators have introduced a 
parody exception in their copyright laws to strike a balance between the 
competing interests at stake. Whether the argument is based on further realising 
fundamental human rights,36 fostering creativity to contribute to social welfare 
by favouring discursivity,37 adjusting the market,38 or a combination of these 
approaches, the parody defence provides an internal limit to copyright law in 
favour of users and future creators, and at the expense of the original creator. 
                                                 
33  Preamble of the Infosoc Directive, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, pp. 1–16.  
34  Impact assessment copyright package 2016, p. 63, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/impact-assessment-modernisation-eu-copyright-rules (accessed 21 
March 2018). 
35  Berne Covention, art. 9(2).  
36  Mary Wong, “’Transformative’ User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: Infringing 
Derivative Works or Fair Use?” (2009) 11 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 
1075-1139, p. 1081; Michael Spence, “Intellectual property and the problem of parody” (1998) 
114 Law Quarterly Review 594-620, p.601; Ellen Gredley and Spyros Maniatis, “Parody: A Fatal 
Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody and its Treatment in Copyright” (1997) European 
Intellectual Property Review 330-344, pp. 343-344. 
37  In the UK, see HM Government, Consultation on copyright (2011), para. 7.103; Digital 
Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth: An Independent Report by Professor Ian 
Hargreaves (IPO, 2011); Taking forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Second Stage 
Consultation on Copyright Exceptions (IPO, 2009); Taking forward the Gowers Review of 
Intellectual Property: Proposed changes to copyright exceptions (IPO, 2008); Gowers Review of 
Intellectual Property (HMSO, 2009); More generally, see  Séverine Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et 
protection des œuvres dans l'univers numérique (Larcier, 2007), p. 466. 
38  Anna Spies, “Revering Irreverence: A Fair Dealing Exception for Both Weapon and Target 
Parodies” (2011) 34(3) UNSW Law Journal 1122-1144, p. 1141; Wendy Gordon, “Excuse and 
justification in the law of fair use: transaction costs have always been part of the story” 
(2003) 50 Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A 149-198, pp. 158 and 166; Spence, supra n. 
36, p. 603. 
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While the boundaries of a specific parody exception in copyright law 
remain to be defined,39 restrictions nevertheless operate on it. Firstly, various 
legal instruments do not define the term parody and related concepts, resulting 
in different definitions per territory. While the absence of a definition enables 
more flexibility to adapt the law to users’ habits, it might have a deterrent effect 
until a body of case law provides more guidance. Secondly, there are differences 
in the interpretation and application of the parody exception amongst the various 
jurisdictions. These differences render the duties of intermediaries even more 
difficult, and hamper the development of a digital environment for copyright 
protection and creativity.  Recently, the CJEU had its first opportunity to interpret 
the parody exception under EU copyright law in the Deckmyn case.40 The Court 
noted that parody had to be interpreted as an autonomous concept requiring two 
core elements: an expression of humour or mockery which, while evoking an 
existing work, is noticeably different from that work.41 Therefore, if a parody does 
not satisfy these conditions, the parodist should get a licence from the right-
holder to avoid copyright infringement. If an online video shared on YouTube 
meets these conditions, it should be deemed as lawful but, as discussed in Section 
3, it is likely to be picked up by Content ID as infringing.  
 Methodology 
The empirical analysis builds on the dataset used in two previous studies by Kris 
Erickson et al. in 2013 and 2014.42 These studies analysed 1845 user-generated 
                                                 
39  Sabine Jacques, “Are the new ‘fair dealing’ provisions an improvement on the previous UK 
law, and why?” (2015) 10 (9) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 699-706, p. 703. 
40  Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Vandersteen, C-201/13, EU:C:2014:2132. 
41  Ibid., para. 20. 
42  Kris Erickson et al., “The reasons for copyright takedown on YouTube, and what they tell us 
about copyright exceptions”, paper presented to the EUROCPR Conference, 24-25/3/2014, 
Brussels available at http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/94718/1/94718.pdf (accessed 21 March 2018); 
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parodies, stemming from 343 commercial pop music videos shared on YouTube. 
The original study was carried out in January 2012 and was based on content 
produced in the previous twelve months. The data collection relied on:  
British Charts Company data to obtain a list of 343 music singles that charted 
in the UK in 2011 and had a corresponding licensed music video hosted on 
YouTube (either the VEVO or Warner licensed music channel). The authors 
then searched for parody videos referencing those commercial works by 
searching for “song name + parody” in YouTube’s internal search engine. 
The researchers located 8299 user-generated music video parodies 
referencing the original 343 commercial music videos. A randomly-selected 
sample of 1843 parodies from within that larger sample… The authors also 
recorded the location (URL) of each of those 1845 parody videos to enable 
future analysis.43 
The present research extends the data collection up to December 2016. By using 
the content’s location (URL), we assessed the way content is blocked or taken 
down by identifying and isolating which videos were taken down in 2016 due to 
a copyright claim. We also distinguished videos which were manually taken 
down from those blocked by the Content ID match policies.44 This paper focuses 
on the evaluation of the supplied and consumed product diversity of a cohort 
                                                 
Kris Erickson et al., Copyright and the Economic Effects of Parody: An Empirical Study of Music 
Videos on the YouTube Platform and an Assessment of the Regulatory Options Parody and Pastiche. 
Study III (2013) an independent report commissioned by the Intellectual Property Office 
(IPO) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/309903/ipres
earch-parody-report3-150313.pdf (accessed 21 March 2018). 
43  Ibid., pp. 10-11. As the methodology for this dataset has been explained in both earlier 
studies, the present authors refer the reader to these for further details on the data collection. 
44  This was possible by combining checking each message displayed on unavailable content 
(“blocked”, referring to a Content ID match policy, and ”removed” signifying a manual 
takedown) with the information about manual takedowns gathered from the Google 
Transparency Report and Lumen Project. 
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(Erickson et al.’s cleaned sample – 1839 videos) at three different moments 𝑡1 
(2012), 𝑡2 (2013), and 𝑡3 (2016).  
To reflect fundamental rights as well as copyright concerns, we opted to 
evaluate both supplied and consumed diversity. Supplied diversity refers to the 
content available on the platform that could be accessed by the public. This 
measure focuses on the individual’s right freely to express themselves. 
Consumed diversity focuses on what is actually being watched by the public and 
focuses on how voices are being heard.45 While diversity legitimately may focus 
on just supplied expressions, in order to be relevant freedom of expression must 
combine both the supply and the demand sides. 
If the focus is solely on supplied diversity, then counting (say videos or 
parodies) is sufficient and a useful index is simply the inverse of the number of 
videos or parodies. Once we are concerned with consumed diversity, we need a 
measure of diversity allowing for differences in popularity. One measure which 
does so is the Herfindahl Index (also termed the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
hereinafter ‘HHI’). While HHI is typically associated with industrial economics, 
where it is used to measure the concentration of firms in a market, it is also used 
to measure diversity where the subject of the research has been classified into 
types.46 Initially developed by Edward H. Simpson (“Simpson Index of 
Diversity”), the index presents itself as follows: 
                                                 
45  EU Parliament resolution of 12/09/2013 on promoting the European cultural and creative 
sectors as sources of economic growth and jobs (2012/2302(INI)), at M: “EU citizens need to 
be provided with a cultural and artistic education from an early age so as to develop their 
own understanding of arts and culture, make their voice heard and develop awareness of the 
great diversity of cultures present in Europe, and thereby promote their own creativity and 
expression, as well as cultural diversity”. 
46  Radu Guiasu and Silviu Guiasu, “The weighted Gini-Simpson Index: Revitalizing an old 
index of biodiversity” (2012) International Journal of Ecology, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/478728 (accessed 21 March 2018). 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼 =∑𝑝𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
N means the number of types of interest and 𝑝𝑖 the proportion of views of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
type of video. With N types, if all types attract the same number of views, 𝑝𝑖 =
1
𝑁
 
and 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1
𝑁
.47 Thus if each type is equally popular, it is as if we are just counting 
varieties. If one type, say j, attract all the views, 𝑝𝑗 = 1 and 𝑝𝑖 = 0 for all other 
types’ is, and so 𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1. The value of this index will therefore vary from 
1
𝑁
 to 1. 
To put it simply, the closer the value is to 1, the lesser the diversity. An alternative 
way to use the HHI to illustrate diversity (when popularity is a legitimate aspect 
to consider) is by calculating the inverse of the index. This measures how many 
categories with identical numbers of views would yield the same HHI and is 
sometimes referred to in competition analysis as the “Numbers-Equivalent” or 
in political science as the “Effective Number of Parties” (“Eff N”).48 In our context, 
this index tells us that it is as if there were only Eff N videos available to the public 
rather than the 1839 videos constituting our sample.49 
These indices enable a multi-dimensional approach that considers variety, 
balance, and disparity. Diversity is not just about the number of different 
varieties of video available, but also about how likely they are to be watched by 
people, since diversity may actually be located in the tail. If one variety attracts a 
majority of views, we may have diversity in theory but not in reality because 
network effects (the desire to watch what others are watching) may render the 
                                                 
47  𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ (1
𝑁
)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑁 ∙
1
𝑁2
= 1
𝑁
. 
48  Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europe” (1979) 12(1) Comparative Political Studies 3-4, pp. 3.  
49  Whether this is the relevant measure depends on how one assumes that a video is 
discovered – do all videos available on YouTube have an equal chance of being detected or 
does this depend on popularity. If the case is the latter, then the effective measure used 
above is relevant. 
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other varieties largely unseen. Given our purpose, the Eff N is a reasonable way 
to measure the number of types present on YouTube and their relative 
abundance. While most studies generally focus on variety (the number of 
different categories),50 our system follows Stirling’s51 properties and therefore 
also includes balance (the pattern of quantity across the categories)52 and 
disparity (how dissimilar the categories are within a set).53 This gives a more in-
depth analysis of the diversity present within the various categories.  
Before turning to the preliminary results of this model, we need to make 
a few remarks about the dataset (beyond the difficulty of trying to quantify 
something inherently qualitative, namely cultural diversity). Firstly, this dataset 
relates exclusively to the UK music market. Secondly, given the sheer volume of 
content present, the size of the dataset may be distorted, given that the total 
number of views in 2012 (consumption of cultural content) is slightly above 253.4 
million and that these are accounted for by a relatively small number of videos. 
The share of views of the top five videos in 2012 amounts to 36.5% of views. The 
corresponding numbers for the top ten was 50.7% in 2012, and of these only 6.6% 
remained viewable in 2013 with a further reduction of those of 84.3% in 2016. The 
top twenty-five accounted for 71.9% of all views of which only 1.6% remained in 
2013 and even less in 2016. Thirdly, the original dataset comprises parodies based 
on 343 commercial pop music videos shared on YouTube and derived from 
British Charts Company data. These 343 commercial hits are therefore not fully 
representative of the whole market, but this problem is mitigated by the addition 
                                                 
50  The more categories, the more diverse is the set. 
51  Stirling (1998), supra n. 11, pp. 39-41. 
52  The more equal are the shares of views in a category measured against the totality of the set, 
the more diversity is present. 
53  This is subjectively assessed and context-dependent explaining why this column could be 
overlooked. The more disparate the options are within the set for identical variety and 
balance, the more diverse the set is.  
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of user-generated parodies. This produces 8299 videos, from which the 1843 
sample is derived. Finally, there are likely to be some problems of transparency 
and robustness because of issues of data quality. The data was collected for 
different initial purposes, and hence this has constrained us in the variables used 
and in the building of indexes. Given the limitation of the data, care must be 
exercised not to over-interpret the results. The analysis in Section 6 illustrates 
both what can be done with, and potential pitfalls from relying too mechanically 
on, the statistical analysis. 
 Findings 
The assumption is that the most harmful impact on cultural diversity is that 
caused by the unavailability of content, rather than the tracking statistics or 
monetisation match policies which still enable the public to access the online 
content. The preliminary results demonstrate patterns in the application of 
YouTube’s Content ID on the diversity of cultural expressions supplied and 
consumed on the platform.  
6.1 Content blocking significantly impacts both supplied and 
consumed diversity 
Before taking into consideration the role of algorithms, the following general 
observations can be made based on how the initial Erickson sample was 
constituted.  
The first observation relates to whether consumed diversity of the original 
videos matches diversity in supply of content to viewers. Calculating the Eff N 
based on the share of views of each of the 343 original videos, we find that Eff N 
= 75.1. In other words, the consumed diversity is considerably lower than the 
supplied one. The second observation focuses on whether the incidence of 
(2018) 15:2 SCRIPTed 277  296 
parodying is equally spread over the 343 original videos. Types in this case are 
each of the original videos, i.e. N = 343. The total number of parodies was 8299. 
Calculating the Eff N first for the number of parodies for each type, we find Eff 
N = 25.5. Contrasting this with N = 343, it is obvious that the supply of parodies 
is extremely skewed. If all the videos were equally popular as object for a parody, 
it is as if we only started with about twenty-five videos. If we turn to the 
popularity of these parodies, we can again compute the Eff N, in this case finding 
Eff N = 22.5. Thus, there seems to be a concentration (even if not by much) on a 
few original videos as object of parody. That does not imply that there is a close 
correlation between the number of parodies of a given video and their respective 
popularity. This illustrates a case where counting numbers (for example variety) 
is insufficient and requires considering balance and disparity. 
Interestingly, the dataset seems to imply that it is not because an original 
hit attracts a lot of parodies that the sum of parodies is significant. Taken 
collectively, these parodies seem to account merely for a small share of overall 
views. For example, there may be many parodies of video X, but not many people 
are actually watching these. As an example, the video with the most parodies by 
number attracts almost 11% of all parodies both by number and by popularity, 
while the videos attracting the second and third highest number of parodies 
(9.9% and 8.9%, respectively) attract a much smaller share of views (6.3% and 
2.7%, respectively). Equally, while the top ten parodies by views attracted more 
than half of all views, they accounted for less than a third of the actual number 
of parodies. Thus, it is not just important to decide whether the key consideration 
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is supplied or consumed diversity, but also what the object (of the hits or of the 
parodies) of diversity is.54 That may depend on the policy question asked.55  
Turning to the availability of the parodies sampled in 2012, and later in 
2013 and 2016, we observe the impact of the technology on the environment in 
which videos are shared. 
 
  
                                                 
54  See Section 7.1 infra. 
55  For example, do we care about the number of parodies an original has attracted? Or should 
we focus on videos which generate a debate amongst these? 
(2018) 15:2 SCRIPTed 277  298 
 
2013 2016 
Descriptive statistics N Percent N Percent 
Live 1471 80.0% 1088 59.2% 
Manual copyright take-down 
265 14.4% 
118 6.4% 
Algorithm-based blocking 591 32.1% 
Not available for other reason* 103 5.6% 42 2.3% 
Total N 1839 100 1839 100 
  2013 2016 
Effective number of videos viewed 27.2 20.2 
Effective number of YouTubers - 13.6 
Top 5 YouTubers' share of total 
views 
- 55.5% 
Top 10 YouTubers' share of total 
views 
- 72.2% 
* This includes take down for other reasons than a copyright claim. 
Table 1: General descriptive statistics 
The first observation from Table 1 is that the effect of Content ID cannot be 
underestimated. If we combine all the content removal and blocking due to 
copyright concerns, we can see that in December 2016 Content ID accounted for 
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83.4% of the blocking, while manual take-down only accounted for 16.7%.56 Such 
figures could demonstrate the efficiency of the technology for removing 
copyright infringing content, but this would be a fallacy because, as the original 
study from 2013 by Erickson et al. revealed, only a very small percentage of 
audio-visual works in the sample infringed copyright.57 
The second observation is that when we aggregate views up to the level 
of the numbers of YouTube users posting videos, only a few videos attract most 
of the views: the top five in the sample by number of views account for slightly 
over a half (55.5%) of all views, while the top ten account for almost a quarter 
(72.2%). Hence, when analysing diversity, it matters greatly whether we focus on 
“the number of voices” or “the number of voices heard”. In the former case, we 
can simply count the number of voices, i.e. YouTube users. In the latter case, the 
popular videos need to carry more weight in our measure and we will resort to 
the indices described in Section 5 supra. Using Eff N yields our third observation 
from Table 1, namely that out of our cohort of 1839 videos, only twenty-seven 
videos were effectively viewed in 2013 and only twenty remained in 2016. This 
tells us that viewing figures are very skewed in our sample. Even more 
astonishing is the number of effective YouTube users present in this sample. As 
opposed to the 940 YouTubers sharing content in 2012, it is if there are as few as 
thirteen effective YouTube users in 2016. While this can be explained by the fact 
that most of the views are concentrated in the top five (55.5%) and top ten (72.2%), 
                                                 
56  Google advertised that overall, in 2016, that 98% of allegedly copyright infringing material is 
dealt through Content ID and 2% relates to manual notice and take-down. Google, How 
Google fights piracy (2016), p. 26 available at 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwxyRPFduTN2TmpGajJ6TnRLaDA (accessed 21 March 
2018). 
57  Only 13% of all the UGC were found as mislabelled as “parody” and this does not mean that 
these 13% might be infringing as other exceptions might be applicable. 5% were also found 
are direct copy and therefore highly likely that these 5% constitute infringing materials 
Erickson, supra n. 42, pp. 27 and 31. 
(2018) 15:2 SCRIPTed 277  300 
it is surprising that the sample is so skewed that out of so many audio-visual 
works shared, only a handful of content creators are able effectively to 
communicate their creative expression to the public. From the perspective of 
consumed diversity, this turns out to be surprisingly low. While this could be an 
artefact of the particular sample, it is also possible that this is a more robust 
finding if there are strong network effects at play when it comes to the popularity 
of items.  
Furthermore, audio-visual works which copy the video are more likely to 
be picked up by Content ID than to be removed by a notice and take-down 
complaint.58 This is easily explained by the functioning of digital fingerprinting 
technology as described in Section 3. As this is how the technology is meant to 
perform best (i.e. to find visual or audio matches) this is where the impact will be 
greater. Nevertheless, this raises concerns as to the likelihood of meeting the 
objectives sought by the introduction of a parody exception in copyright law. 
Indeed, while some countries seem to be permitting the copying of entire works 
(for example copying of sound recordings with altered lyrics),59 it remains to be 
seen whether the application of the parody exception in other jurisdictions, 
including the UK, will result in the same or similar decisions.60 
6.2 Case study: Gender and diversity 
While a number of features of a particular parody, such as its target, the degree 
of professionalism of the product, and the level of critique involved, may have 
                                                 
58  By running a multinomial regression, our hypothesis leads us to believe that an audio-visual 
work which copies the sound recording of a copyright protected work has significant 
chances of being blocked by the algorithm, rather than remaining available.  
59  France: Cass. Civ. 1, 12 January 1988, RTD Com. 1988, 227; André Françon, “Questions de 
droit d’auteur relatives aux parodies et productions similaires” (June 1988) Droit d’auteur 
303. 
60  Jacques, supra n. 39. 
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an impact on which of the rules are implemented in response to the algorithm’s 
finding of a match, gender should not be one of these. We use this to investigate 
deeper into both the original data set and our extension of the data until 2016.  
Looking at the 2012 data only, but before sampling of the parodies had 
taken place, i.e. the full set of 8299 parodies of 343 original videos, we find that 
among the original data, male performers dominate in terms of the original 
videos (accounting for 58.3% of the original videos in the sample), while female 
artists dominate when it comes to being parodied, whether by number of 
parodies or by the popularity of the parody (see Table 2). 
 Original videos Parodies Views of parodies 
Female 33.2% 55.0% 52.7% 
Male 58.3% 42.5% 45.3% 
Mixed 8.5% 2.5% 2.0% 
Table 2: Share by gender of performers 
In other words, in the sample, women performers are disproportionately likely 
to be parodied. Who then are engaging in the parody and to what extent is this 
affected by the algorithm? For both 2012 and 2016, we can divide the sample into 
five types (male solo, male group, mixed, female solo, female group). Calculating 
the Eff N for the 2012 sample and for those remaining in 2016, we get a value of 
3.05 and 3.10 respectively, indicating that the parodies are concentrated on a 
subset of the five types and that there is not much difference between the two 
dates. Investigating bit further into the data (Table 3), the absence of female 
parodists is clear cut. Purely female parodists account for only 23%–24% of the 
parodies in the sample and more dramatically only for 3%–3.5% of parodies by 
views.  
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Gender By number 2012 By views 2012 By number 2016 By views 2016 
Female Group 11.9% 1.1% 11.2% 1.1% 
Female solo 12.1% 2.5% 11.9% 2.0% 
Male Group 20.8% 36.8% 21.5% 38.8% 
Male Solo 37.0% 21.5% 35.7% 25.7% 
Mixed group 18.2% 38.1% 19.6% 32.5% 
Table 3: Share of parodies 
For some time now, the platform has recognised that women were outnumbered 
as content creators. Our results show that for this sample, they are also 
outnumbered in terms of share of popularity. This can perhaps be explained by 
the environment of the platform. For example, considering the nature of the 
comments made on female performer videos, many of these are sexually 
suggestive, threatening, or hateful in nature. Even if one disables the comment 
function on the platform, this would not alter the central problem. While women 
remain a minority on YouTube, there will be relatively few safe spaces for 
women’s expression to flourish.  
6.3 Remarks on the data analysis 
In a very specific dataset we have found that that both supplied and consumed 
diversity have only limited correlation with the presence of Content ID – in most 
cases the change in diversity has been very modest and the direction of change 
has not been consistent. That does not imply that there are no problems; it may 
simply be that the existing data is not sufficiently well suited to detect such 
effects.  What we have found is that it matters greatly how we conceive of, and 
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hence quantify and qualify, diversity.  A key question we should ask in future 
work is: how do people find a video? If we are dealing with a neutral search 
engine, it is possible that merely counting the number of videos in each category 
will be sufficient, but if videos are found by word of mouth recommendation, 
then some sort of epidemic model is needed which would possibly lead us (like 
a short-cut) to use the number of views as a basis to calculate shares. But it may 
also be that people use a search engine which uses a particular algorithm to 
decide the order in which it shows search results (based on advertising, for 
example).  
Secondly, there is often a clear “most popular parody”. If people learn 
from each other, we would expect network effects to operate so that once a video 
gets to a level of popularity it dominates that category. One question we could 
not explore is what would happen if the AAPS removes the most popular 
parody: would the next most popular simply replace it, almost as if the AAPS 
functions as a forest fire which, in taking out the old trees, gives breathing space 
for new growth? If that is the case, then while the take-down by the AAPS may 
be a personal tragedy for the creator of the most popular parody, this will have 
little to no effect on diversity or possibly even welfare.   
Thirdly, the Eff N is a useful statistic to base an assessment of diversity on 
variety, instead of intensity. However, it can present a misleading picture where 
the identity of the category with the largest share changes, but not the relative 
shares. In cases such as some of those explored here, where number of types is 
small it is both feasible and essential to investigate further. 
 Proposals to preserve and promote supplied and 
consumed cultural diversity using AAPSs 
Given the limited correlation between enforcement and cultural diversity, this 
(2018) 15:2 SCRIPTed 277  304 
section aims to make a set of modest proposals for preserving and promoting the 
rich cultural diversity present in the online environment in the European Union. 
The proposals focus firstly on the EU regulatory framework and newly proposed 
amendments, before revisiting general principles related to due process and 
“best practices”. Finally, we discuss the idea that technologies could be used to 
facilitate licensing opportunities directly within online sharing platforms. 
7.1 Fostering cultural diversity through a robust and coherent legal 
framework 
The last fifteen years have taught us that a piecemeal regulatory framework 
fragments the EU digital single market. Instead of creating duplicates by 
repeating proposals made by others,61 we believe there is a real opportunity for 
the EU to implement a legal framework where a diversity of cultural expressions 
is promoted despite the current lack of robust international legal provisions. This 
can be achieved through the strengthening of copyright exceptions and further 
protection of the public domain by expanding the mandatory character of 
exceptions, and by providing adequate incentives for bigger industry players 
such as intermediaries, publishers, record labels and collecting rights societies, to 
respect both fundamental rights and the public interest.  
The main concern is that the more trust that is placed in the hands of 
commercial private entities, the less likely it is that economic, cultural, or social 
diversity will be present in online sharing platforms. Advertising-funded online 
sharing platforms can increasingly bind together individuals living in different 
territories. The preservation and promotion of cultural diversity comprises two 
                                                 
61  Such as adding clarity in the legal framework by redrafting art. 13 of the new proposed 
directive, delineating the interaction between this new proposed directive and the other EU 
instruments such as the E-Commerce and Enforcement Directives and the EU Charter, and, 
in general, rationalising the adequacy of liability regimes for online intermediaries. 
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strands: (1) to enable individuals to have equal access to different cultures, and 
(2) to enable individuals located in one territory to be heard in another. Therefore, 
to avoid cultural homogenisation within the EU digital single market, legal 
provisions should ensure efficient enforcement of fundamental rights (freedom 
of expression and copyright, through the right to property), and support 
principles of democracy throughout the EU. 
The problem with this proposal is getting agreement on how we define 
cultural diversity. If the concept spreads across policy debates but remains a 
vague concept, it will be hard to preserve and promote it. With this study, we 
have provided variables through which diversity in online sharing platforms can 
be measured, although statutory metrics would be welcomed and would 
facilitate its adjudication.62 
An alternative approach might be to promote democratic principles in the 
online environment by adopting a balanced copyright paradigm, compliant with 
freedom of expression.63 In essence, such a proposal would ensure that the 
traditional instruments capable of promoting cultural diversity can be fostered 
in the digital era. By guaranteeing that legitimate expressions are not subject to 
market censorship, the public is able to determine which cultural expressions can 
be accessed and consumed. In the longer run, such a position enables different 
cultures to interact and foster creativity and innovation, possibly leading to 
economic growth and competition within the EU and the global digital market. 
In essence, there is a need to ensure cross-border flows of repertoire and user-
generated content on platforms.64  
                                                 
62  European Commission, The AB Music Working Group Report December 2015-June 2016, p. 15, 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/sites/creative-europe/files/ab-
music-working-group_en.pdf  (accessed 22 March 2018). 
63  Ibid., p. 53. 
64  Ibid., p. 39. 
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7.2 Ensuring due process online 
Moving on to enforcement, blindly trusting private commercial interests to tackle 
online copyright infringement is a mistake. Not only do the industry players and 
intermediaries often have opposing commercial interests, but they rarely have 
the individual and wider public’s best interest at heart. Therefore, we urge EU 
policy-makers to place obligations on intermediaries and right-holders to respect 
due process as a counter-weight to the reliance on algorithms to detect and 
identify infringing content.  
Where business models develop in conjunction with the implementation 
of the legal framework, intermediaries try to protect themselves by applying 
match policies without due assessment of their illegality. Current business 
models seem to take little note of copyright exceptions, jeopardising the careful 
balance struck by legislators throughout the Union. The current copyright 
package falls short on this front as well. By requiring intermediaries to negotiate 
with right-holders and act as “judges” on their platforms, the risk is that major 
market players are going to abuse the system, curtailing freedom of expression 
and endangering cultural diversity.  
Consequently, the new copyright paradigm could push for a more 
efficient and independent dispute resolution system. This is not to say that such 
system could not include automation. Indeed, the sheer volume of shared content 
makes it impractical to involve the judiciary every step of the way. Nevertheless, 
the possibility of using the judicial or administrative authorities appears essential 
for the safeguarding of cultural diversity.65 
                                                 
65  For example, see Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice of Germany], GEMA v 
Rapidshare, I ZR 80/12 (15 August 2013).  
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For example, 90% or some other agreed-upon large portion of matching 
content could be left to the internal dispute resolution set up by intermediaries, 
using AAPSs as they currently operate. For smaller portions of matches of alleged 
infringement, intermediaries are not best placed to assess the legality of the use. 
Here, AAPSs are inefficient, and so the option of presenting the facts to an 
independent authority becomes necessary.66  
In any case, more transparency and harmonisation in the design of these 
internal dispute resolution systems and external recourses must be 
contemplated. While parts of these enforcement mechanisms can be left to self-
regulation, some harmonisation would increase legal certainty and reduce the 
costs and efforts of individuals in trying to understand how to best dispute an 
automated notification of infringement across the myriad of online platforms.67 
Furthermore, as Garstka indicated, harmonisation in this field could give much 
needed attention to human rights such as freedom of expression, the right to 
privacy, and the freedom to conduct a business.68 Finally, the intermediaries 
could be obliged to publish the outcomes of dispute resolution settlements on 
their website or on an external source, as in Google’s Transparency Report69 or the 
Lumen Project.70 Not only would such an initiative enhance oversight of the 
intermediaries’ actions and attitudes in the described copyright enforcement 
process, but it would also educate the wider public as to which uses are 
permitted.  
                                                 
66  For example, in France where an administrative authority was established to target illegal 
activities.  
67  Krzysztof Garstka, “Looking above and beyond the blunt expectation: specified request as 
the recommended approach to intermediary liability in cyberspace” (2016) 7(3) European 
Journal of Law and Technology 1-23, p. 10. 
68  Ibid., p. 12. 
69  https://www.google.com/transparencyreport (accessed 21 March 2018). 
70  https://lumendatabase.org (accessed 21 March 2018). 
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7.3 Streamlining intermediaries’ “best practices” for cultural 
diversity to strive 
The proposed art. 13(3) relies on hosting intermediaries and right-holders to 
negotiate best practices. There are dangers in such an approach. Firstly, the 
current online creative ecosystem already relies on private agreements reached 
between right-holders and intermediaries at the expense of the wider public. As 
an illustration, see the former PRS-YouTube deal:  
If PRS for Music becomes aware that a members’ work fits the definition of 
derogatory use, PRS for Music can notify YouTube on that member's behalf 
and work with YouTube to remove that content. Under the Joint Online 
Licence, a derogatory use is defined as a parodied work, or one that is 
insulting or detrimental to the composer of the commercially released sound 
recording.71 
This illustrates how the defensive nature of copyright exceptions can be exploited 
by right-holders and intermediaries to secure the interests of right-holders. It can 
also further exemplify the danger of self-regulation in this area. Indeed, these 
agreements are generally reached in a non-disclosure form which removes the 
opportunity to verify compliance with copyright legislation or fundamental 
rights.  
Secondly, we can identify best practice by looking at YouTube’s Content 
ID system. In Section 2, we mentioned the choice of between using “tracking 
statistics” as a harsher policy than “monetisation”. It is hard to justify these 
policies. Therefore, self-regulation is likely to create an open-door for 
intermediaries to choose the harshness factor linked to certain match policies. 
                                                 
71  See http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/prs-deal-with-youtube-what-does-it-mean-
for-songwriters (accessed 21 March 2018). 
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This may benefit certain right-holders,72 but at the expense of smaller and newer 
content creators. It may also produce increased bureaucracy for individuals who 
wish to navigate the platform, and increase the incentive to outsmart the system.  
The following guidelines might help. First, users could be given more 
information about the process of uploading content. While YouTube does offer 
some guidance, it is somewhat biased. Second, the match policy should reflect 
the careful balance struck by legislators in the legal instruments between 
exclusive rights and permissible uses. One of the key difficulties resulting from 
both proposals relates to the territoriality principle of copyright legislation. A 
way to mitigate this could be to adapt the interface to identify the location of the 
infringer, which is likely to coincide with the first territory in which the user 
enjoys exclusive rights. Third, the territoriality principle could be better 
respected by identifying the user’s upload country as the default option, rather 
than it being “worldwide”, as is currently the practice on YouTube. Fourth, 
intermediaries should be pushed to acquire more information about who the 
legitimate right-holder is. Right now, the first claimant of content is presumed to 
be the right-holder, and there is little opportunity to dispute this. An easy way 
could be to insert a field where the alleged right-holder could explain why he/she 
believes they are entitled to enforce his/her copyright prerogatives. Finally, 
diversity of cultural expressions could be promoted by imposing quotas in the 
display of search results on the platform.73 Currently in the online world, there 
remains a fragmentation along national and linguistic lines which results in 
limited choices for consumers. 
                                                 
72  The ones who signed with a publisher or record label and are members of collecting rights 
societies.  
73  Such quotas (or targets) are already present in some member states such as France for 
broadcasting of content on the radio. This is also supported by European Commission, The 
AB Music Working Group Report December 2015- June 2016, supra n. 63, p. 39. 
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7.4 Facilitating the licensing system 
A fair and sustainable digital environment will not be achieved unless progress 
is made with regards to licensing works in the digital single market. Some 
national initiatives (like the Copyright Hub74 in the UK) or private initiatives 
(such as ICE)75 are welcome, but should be scaled up to the EU level.  
With the development of relevant technology, there is a real possibility for 
intermediaries to include, within their interface, a way for users to get a license 
for using content. Not only would this benefit the intermediaries by fostering the 
upload and promotion of UGC, but it would also benefit the creative industries 
and augment their revenue. An EU initiative similar to the UK Copyright Hub 
could enable customisation of licenses depending on the intended use. Such a 
user-friendly licensing system would require an efficient way to deal with license 
fees and ensure fair remuneration to collecting rights societies and content 
creators. An EU licensing hub would be of no value if there is no way to assure 
the transfer of money from the user to the right-holders. Finally, this would create 
a European database of works, as is currently underway due to the joint efforts 
of some EU collecting rights societies. 
 Conclusion 
Scholars have already warned that the current legal framework, enforcement 
mechanisms, and market power of certain players create a “cultural blackhole” 
where the distribution of diverse cultural expression is threatened.76 The global 
                                                 
74  http://www.copyrighthub.co.uk (accessed 21 March 2018). 
75  http://www.iceservices.com/about-ice (accessed 21 March 2018). 
76  Johnlee Curtis, “Culture and the Digital Copyright Chimera: Assessing the International 
Regulatory System of the Music Industry in Relation to Cultural Diversity” (2006) 13 
International Journal of Cultural Property 59-97, p. 64. 
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dominance of particular creative industries, together with their copyright 
enforcement strategies and increasing use of AAPSs, are driving towards market 
censorship, thus creating concerns for cultural diversity. Given the lack of a 
robust legal framework promoting and preserving cultural expression, copyright 
and freedom of expression are the main instruments for achieving this greater 
objective. By granting a broad right for individuals to seek, impart, and receive 
information and copyright, freedom of expression rewards and incentivises 
creative endeavour. Against increasingly far-reaching copyright laws, legislators 
have introduced copyright exceptions, such as the parody exception, to ensure 
the preservation of this specific genre. This recalibration is not reflected in 
business practices and risks being reliant on the collaboration of private 
commercial entities, absent robust legal provisions that regulate their “best 
practices” and ensure due process. 
If we recognise that audio-visual content has the power to shape culture 
by allowing the public to enjoy works in unexpected ways, but also to allow 
authors and individuals to disseminate their work in a globalised digital 
environment, then the copyright paradigm must tackle misappropriation and 
market censorship by implementing fair and efficient independent enforcement 
mechanisms. Without such a palliative, the agglomeration of culture is likely to 
be magnified by the ever-increasing reliance on “content recognition 
technologies” such as Content ID. This was demonstrated in our empirical 
research which demonstrated that Content ID has an important effect on some 
categories of content while leaving others unchanged. Here, the algorithm 
mainly blocked the most popular videos, giving the impression that diversity 
was therefore increased.  
In sum, this article seeks to raise awareness about the need to secure full 
realisation of fundamental rights in the cultural digital ecosystem in order to 
uphold the promise of preserving and promoting cultural diversity. Our 
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approach to the problem of quantifying these hard-to-qualify values relied on 
two indices: HHI and Eff N. Whilst the HHI is meaningful for assessing variety, 
balance, and disparity of relevance, the Eff N enables the understanding of the 
weight of each category. This combination of indices is especially important in 
an epidemic model where there are important network effects. In this case, as the 
popularity of a video is self-reinforcing, counting the number of varieties is not 
sufficient because the public will not be able to access less popular categories. 
Consequently, instead of regulating online-sharing platforms by requiring them 
to introduce AAPSs, a better path would be to gain a deeper understanding as to 
how cultural expressions flow online and how the public access them.  
As copyright law is a double-edged sword which can either foster cultural 
diversity or lead to abuses which endanger the diversity of cultural expression, 
the debates surrounding the new copyright legal framework should consider 
introducing vigorous and strict independent dispute resolution mechanisms to 
mitigate the inevitable reliance on algorithms to tackle large-scale piracy. 
Furthermore, instead of focusing on control, a better avenue – already advocated 
elsewhere – is to focus on providing adequate incentives for future authors to 
create and to reward the investment made by cultural industries. As a by-
product, these balanced copyright and enforcement paradigms will boost 
competition in the digital single market by concentrating less market power in 
the hands of some actors (mainly collecting rights societies) to allow new creators 
to enter the market for cultural goods. Equally, such a balanced system would 
align better with the interests of consumers and citizens, as copyright will 
promote both corporate interests and cultural diversity.  
